In this paper, we examine the determinants and consequences of changes in hedge fund fee structure using a novel dataset that tracks changes in hedge fund compensation contracts over time. Contrary to conventionally held belief of no fee changes for hedge funds, we provide evidence on both fee increases and decreases with similar incidence.
Determinants and Implications of Fee Changes in the Hedge Fund Industry Abstract
In this paper, we examine the determinants and consequences of changes in hedge fund fee structure using a novel dataset that tracks changes in hedge fund compensation contracts over time. Contrary to conventionally held belief of no fee changes for hedge funds, we provide evidence on both fee increases and decreases with similar incidence.
We find that fee changes tend to manifest across all three components of the compensation contract, namely the management fee, incentive fee, and the high watermark provision, often in tandem. Allowing for the correlation in these three fee components, we find that funds respond symmetrically to past performance by increasing the incentive fee following good performance and decreasing the incentive fee subsequent to poor performance. In contrast, funds tend to increase the management fee following higher capital flows in the hedge fund industry in order to mitigate decreasing returns to scale while larger funds decrease the management fee to pass on the economies of scale to the investors. Further, we observe a mean reversion in fee changes, both for incentive fee and management fee, where funds that deviate from the average fees within their investment style tend to change their fees towards the average. Finally, we find that fee changes have significant implications for future fund performance and capital flows.
Future performance is worse subsequent to the fee increase without an equivalent impact on the future performance for the fee decrease. Fund flows tend to be higher after the fee decreases, a result driven by the management fee rather than the incentive fee. Taken together, these findings are suggestive of opportunistic behavior of hedge fund managers in expropriating surplus from their investors.
1. Fees as a bargaining tool between investors and managers − Managers can use higher fees to expropriate the surplus from the investors by increasing the fees after good performance. Both investors and managers may infer superior managerial skill from good performance. Investors are willing to pay a premium to obtain the improved performance. Similarly, managers may require a premium to continue managing the fund. However, such behavior can be opportunistic, where a fund manager may use a string of lucky outcomes as the basis to increase fees.
2. Fees as pricing to control flows - Bris et al. (2009) show that well-performing mutual funds that close for new investment to constrain more inflows, tend to increase their fees at the time of closing the funds. In case of hedge funds, there are restrictions on capital withdrawal in the form of lockups and extended redemption periods. Hence, a priori, there is less incentive to use fee decreases as a way to retain assets under management, although fees could still be increased to restrict inflows to mitigate decreasing returns to scale.
Changing fees as a tool to change managerial incentives -Extant hedge fund
literature (e.g., Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) , Chakraborty and Ray (2008) , Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) , Panageas and Westerfield (2009) , Ray (2010) , and Aragon and Nanda (2011) ) shows that hedge fund compensation contract provides incentives to managers to both exert effort to improve future performance as well as to engage in risk-shifting behavior.
Changing the fees in the compensation contract would change incentives for fund managers. For example, increasing incentive fees may help improve fund performance and can lead to increase in risk-taking tendency of fund managers.
Our tests of these competing hypotheses yield several interesting findings. Our first finding stands in contrast with the prevailing understanding that fees are largely fixed at funds' inception. We find that 7.8% of the funds in our sample change at least one component of their fee structure during our three-year sample. 2 Further, the fee changes tend to be largely symmetric with similar incidences of increases and decreases in incentive fee and management fee. Importantly, fee changes are economically large.
The median increase (decrease) in the incentive fee is 15% (5%) corresponding to a median incentive fee of 20% for funds with fee changes. The median increase (decrease) in the management fee is 0.5% (0.75%) for a median management fee of 1.5%. These changes are therefore not likely to be random and should be related to the managers' incentives and investors' demand for the funds.
Our second finding sheds light on the determinants of different fee changes. We find that past performance is symmetrically related to the change in incentive fees:
superior performance leads to increases while poor performance leads to decreases in incentive fees. 3 We also observe that increases in incentive fee are typically accompanied by an addition of the high watermark provision. This is consistent with investors aiming to offset any increase in the manager's risk-taking tendency due to the call-option-like 2 The fee structure in our study consists of the trio of the incentive fee, management fee, and the high watermark provision. Some fee changes, such as a simultaneous increase in both the management and incentive fee, involve changes to multiple components of this trio. 3 We measure the performance both in terms of raw returns as well as style-adjusted returns (in excess of the average returns of all funds following the same investment style). It is interesting to compare and contrast these findings with those in the Warner and Wu (2010) study of changes in mutual fund advisory contracts. Similar to their findings, we observe fee decreases (specifically management fee decreases) are associated with economies of scale and fee increases (specifically incentive fee increases) are driven by superior past performance.
nature of the incentive fee contract with the decrease in propensity to take risk in presence of the high watermark provision (Panageas and Westerfield (2009) ). Among the funds that change fees, each additional percentage of the style-adjusted returns in the previous year is associated with an increase of 6.8% in the incentive fee. Given that the incentive fees are contingent on performance, these findings are intuitive.
In contrast to the changes in the incentive fees which are driven by past performance, we find that past inflows (both at the aggregate hedge fund industry level and at the fund level) and fund size are the major determinants of the changes in the management fee. Larger funds are more likely to reduce the management fees, which suggest that funds pass on economies of scale. We also find that funds with increased inflows increase their management fees, which is consistent with price increasing with the demand as would be the case for any product or service. We also observe a mean reversion in fee changes (both for incentive fee and management fee) where funds that deviate from the average fees within their investment style tend to change their fees towards the average.
Our third finding relates to the changes in the high watermark provision. We observe that funds with better style-adjusted performance and lower past flows are more likely to add the high watermark provision. This finding combined with the tendency to increase the incentive fee subsequent to good performance, suggests that simultaneous changes in incentive fees and high watermark provision help offset the higher risk due to higher incentive fee with lower risk due to the high watermark feature.
Our fourth finding comes from examining the effect of fee changes on future fund performance, flows, and risk-taking behavior over a twelve-month window around the fee change (six months on either side). Funds that increase their fees deliver returns (style-adjusted returns) that are 7.85% (7.63%) lower (both significant at the 5% level) compared to those of similar funds (matched on size, past performance, and flows) that do not increase fees. Looking at specific fee changes, this decline in the performance seems to be driven mainly by increases in the management fees. Changes in the management fee also have economically significant impacts on future flows. Specifically, funds decreasing their management fees experience a boost to net flows going forward. This is consistent with increased investor interest in funds that may be passing on economies of scale to investors. In contrast, we find no evidence that increases in management fees are used to mitigate the decreasing returns to scale by restricting the inflows. This may be because hedge funds can directly control flows through restrictions on subscriptions.
Given that fee increases follow superior past performance, there are two possible explanations for these results: funds expropriating surplus from their investors opportunistically or funds signaling their better quality. The observed economically and statistically significant decreases in performance following fee increases suggest that fee increases may be opportunistic.
Our findings have practical implications for both academics and practitioners alike. Our results suggest that fund managers opportunistically increase fund fees following good performance or higher flows into the fund or into the hedge fund industry.
These fee increases are followed by inferior future performance. This raises the question:
why investors do not withdraw money from such funds? One possibility is that existing investors are often grandfathered in under the lower fee structures following fee increases although they generally share in fee decreases. It is still possible for new investors to avoid putting their money into funds that increase fees but they seem to get lured by funds' superior past performance or capital flows that led to the fee increase in the first place.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the related literature and develops testable hypotheses. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents our findings on the factors driving the changes in the fee structure of hedge funds. Section V provides evidence on how the fee changes influence the changes in the fund's future performance and risk-taking behavior, and how investors respond to the fee changes by altering their capital flows into the funds. Section VI offers concluding remarks.
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Related studies include Ramadorai and Streatfield (2010) , who examine crosssectional variations in the reported hedge fund fees, but with a focus on fund launches and on the effects of fund family on fees and performance. They find that large and wellperforming hedge fund families are more likely to launch funds with higher fees. While they show how new fund launches can change the cross-sectional average of fees over time, we focus on the time-series changes in fees at the individual fund level to examine the determinants and implications of the fee changes over time. Schwarz (2007) and Deuskar et al. (2011) are the two other recent papers that examine the fee changes in the hedge fund industry. These two studies use the annual snapshots of the TASS dataset to study the differences in fees from year to year at the fund level. Our paper extends these studies in several important ways. Our data on fee changes captures the daily changes in incentive fees, management fees, and the HWM feature between April 2008 and June 2011. Although we have a shorter sample period than these studies, the daily fee change data affords two important advantages.
First, we are able to determine fund-specific and market-specific conditions at the time of the fee change with much better accuracy than using the annual snapshots. If a fund changes its fees early in a calendar year and fund's performance or market conditions change in subsequent months, using the annual snapshots may spuriously conflate the causes and effects of the fee changes. For example, if a fund changes its fees in February, using annual snapshots will attribute February-December performance as a cause of the fee change, rather than an effect. The precision in the timing of the fee change also allows us to execute a matched sample analysis of the effects of fee changes.
Since the determinants of fee changes are often both mean-reverting (e.g. extremely good performance is often followed by worse performance) and persistent (funds with good performance are likely to continue performing well), it is challenging to disentangle the causes and effects of fee changes. Our data allows us to do this by creating a matched sample of funds that do not change fees with similar size and performance characteristics and deduce the effects of the change by comparing the funds that change fees with the matched sample of funds that do not change fees.
Finally, our data allows us to jointly study the drivers of changes of all components of the fee structure (incentive fees, management fees and the HWM feature).
With annual snapshots to examine joint changes in multiple components of the compensation contract, there is no assurance that all changes between snapshots occur on the same date. Notably, unlike us, neither Schwarz (2007) nor Deuskar et al. (2011) model simultaneous changes in the different components of the fee structure.
We now develop hypotheses related to the determinants and implications of the fee changes and discuss prior theoretical and empirical literature related to these hypotheses. We organize this section into a general discussion regarding the determinants and implications of the fee increases and decreases as well as the addition and removal of high watermark provisions. We follow this by reviewing relevant literature and presenting a table summarizing our key predictions.
Fee Increases
Fee increases are most likely to arise from superior performance. Since returns are the "goods" provided by hedge funds, higher returns suggest a better good that investors would be willing to pay more for. Thus, we would expect higher returns to drive the fee increases. While both the incentive fees and the management fees may respond to past performance, increasing the incentive fees may be more palatable for the investors since the fund managers only reap the benefits of the increased fees if the funds continue to perform better in the future.
In terms of the future performance following the fee increases, if the funds increase fees truly because their managers have become more skilled or have learnt about their abilities, we would expect improved subsequent performance. However, if the managers increase their fees opportunistically following a lucky high-return period, we would expect subsequent returns to be lower.
Fee increases may also be a result of the higher inflows as funds try to limit incoming capital to mitigate decreasing returns to scale. In a Berk and Green (2004) setting with a finite managerial dollar abnormal return generation capability, increased flows would reduce fund returns which both the fund managers and the investors may try to avoid. We may expect that increased prior flows may drive the fee increases. However,
given the flow-performance relationship documented in Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2003) and Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and Wermers (2009), we must be careful to control for prior performance in testing the relation between the past flows and the fee changes. Also, hedge funds have specific subscription and redemption frequencies that can be used to control inflows and outflows respectively. Hence, the incentive to use fee increase as a tool to control flows is somewhat weaker.
Finally, drawing on the intuition from the work of Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) , Chakraborty and Ray (2008) , and Ray (2010), we expect increases in the incentive fees to be associated with increased risk due to the option-like nature of the incentive fee contract. In addition, increases in the management fee can lead to decreased risk if the managers aim to reduce funds' survival risk and earn management fees as perpetuity. The overall impact of the fee increase will depend on whether the risk-increasing effect of the incentive fee increase dominates the risk-decreasing effect of the management fee increase.
Fee Decreases
Many of our expectations regarding the fee decreases are symmetric to those regarding the fee increases. We expect the fees to decrease following poor performance.
Poor performance may signal lower skill and funds may decrease fees to retain investors.
In terms of inflows, we would expect that decreased inflows may lead to a fee decrease in order to stimulate further flows. However, once again, we have to be careful not to conflate the effects of the flow-performance relationship and any effect the fee changes may have on flows.
Finally, drawing on similar intuition discussed previously on the fee increases, we would expect decreases in the incentive fees to be associated with decreased risk, and decreases in the management fees to lead to increased risk. Again, the overall effect of fee decrease depends on which of the two effects (management fee or incentive fee)
dominates.
Changes in the high watermark provision
Although there are no theoretical or empirical studies providing predictions about the determinants of changes in the high watermark provision, there are several studies (e.g., Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001) , Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) , Panageas and Westerfield (2009) , Aragon and Nanda (2011) ) that predict the addition of a high watermark provision to be associated with a subsequent decrease in risk-taking behavior and vice versa. The underlying intuition behind this prediction is that the high watermark feature curbs the risk-taking behavior as the managers care about the sequence of options in the future that can become out-of-the-money if the managers take on excessive risk.
Other potential links between the fee changes and the performance, risk, and flows
In addition to the primary (or first-order) effects outlined above relating the fee changes to the performance, risk and flows, there are a number of related findings in the literature that may have a bearing on our study.
The findings from Christoffersen (2001) Fee increases could also be used to gouge price-insensitive investors. Christoffersen and Musto (2002) show that the mutual fund pricing depends on demand sensitivity. They find that following poor returns and outflows, funds with retail investors actually increase fees for the remainder of their investors assuming that these remaining investors are price insensitive. These include features such as the lockup period and the redemption period that restrict fund outflows and the subscription period that control inflows into the funds. Hence, compared to mutual funds, hedge funds are perhaps less likely to use fee increases to reduce inflows to mitigate the problem of decreasing returns to scale and/or capacity constraints that can hurt future performance of hedge funds (e.g., Naik, Ramadorai, and
Stromqvist (2007), Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008)).
Both the possibilities discussed in Christoffersen and Musto (2002) and Bris et al. (2009) can coexist in hedge funds and the eventual relation between the fee changes and past fund flows will depend on which of these two effects dominates.
In the table below, we summarize our first-order hypotheses regarding the determinants and implications of fee changes. Blanks cells do not have an explicit empirical prediction associated with them. 
Summary of hypothesized determinants and effects of fee changes

III. Data
This study uses data from the Lipper TASS database that includes the monthly net-of-fee returns and the monthly assets under management of hedge funds, along with their characteristics such as the inception date, lockup period, notice and redemption periods, management fee, incentive fee, and high watermark provision at a point in time.
Although Lipper TASS data has been widely used in a large number of hedge fund studies (e.g., Fung and Hsieh (2000, 2004) , Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007) , Avramov, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2011)), we are the first to use the daily fee-change data, which is proprietary and tracks the fee changes by funds reporting to TASS on a daily basis. Fee-change data includes the changes in incentive fees and management fees, as well as the addition and removal of the high watermark feature. Data on the fee changes is only available since 04/17/2008 when Lipper took over the TASS database. As a result, the sample period of our study starts in April 2008
and ends in June 2011, the last month for which the fee-change data is available.
Given that the performance and assets under management data is only available on a monthly basis, for our empirical analysis, we aggregate fee changes also at a monthly level. Further, in line with the earlier research (e.g., Aragon (2007) , Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2011)), we restrict the sample to hedge funds denominated in US dollars. We exclude the return history of the funds before their entry into the Lipper TASS database to control for the backfilling bias.
We start by reporting the summary statistics on the fee changes in Table I . Panel A shows that out of the 3,814 funds in our sample, 275 funds had one change in the fee structure (either in the incentive fee or the management fee or the high watermark feature), 22 funds had 2 changes, and 1 fund had 3 fee changes, all adding up to a total of 322 changes during our sample period between April 2008 and June 2011. Panels B and C tabulate the number of different types of changes in the fee structure including increase or decrease in the management and/or incentive fees, and addition or removal of the high watermark provision. From Panel B, we observe that cases of the fee increases (either in the incentive fee or the management fee or both) are slightly more frequent than those of the fee decreases (116 fee increases and 107 fee decreases out of the total 322 changes in the fee structure). Additionally, we also notice that most fee changes involve changes in more than one component of the fee structure (management fee, incentive fee, and high watermark feature) at the same time. We allow for the simultaneous changes in these different components of fee in our empirical analysis of determinants of the fee structure.
Panel C provides the frequency of increases and decreases in the management fee and the incentive fee, and addition or removal of the high watermark feature. We observe that the increases and decreases are similar even within the two types of fee: incentive fee (34 increases versus 42 decreases) and management fee (105 increases versus 97 decreases). However, incidence of addition of the high watermark feature is more than four times compared to the removal of the feature (92 versus For example, the average increase (decrease) in the incentive fee is 12.25% (−7.95%). To confirm that these are real fee changes and not some artifact of new funds entering their fees into the Lipper TASS database with a delay, we replicate these tables after grouping the funds by their age at the time of the fee change. A similar pattern can be seen for all the fee changes across different age groups, indicating that the fee changes are not due to the delay in reporting by hedge funds (results not reported in the table). Finally, panel G reports the correlations between the changes in the three components of the fee structure.
We observe high correlation between increase in incentive fee and addition of HWM (correlation = 0.25) consistent with offsetting of high risk from the former with the low risk from the latter. Further, there is high correlation between decreases in management and incentive fees (correlation = 0.25) and that between increase in management fee and decrease in incentive fee (correlation = 0.20), which suggests that investors and managers negotiate over the different components of the fee structure.
Next, we compare the characteristics of the funds that exhibit the fee changes with the funds that have no changes in the fee structure. Table II provides the summary statistics on the fund fees (incentive fee and management fee) and the high watermark for the original contract of the fund manager at the beginning of the sample period. Table II also reports the summary statistics of the operational characteristics of the funds including their inception year, redemption notice period, lockup and payout periods, raw returns, logarithm of the assets under management (AUM) (in $ millions), percentage net inflows, and months in operation (or age).
6 From panel C of Table II , we observe that the funds with the fee changes tend to have lower incidence of use of high watermark feature, lower inception year and greater months in operation (i.e., older), and greater size than funds that do not change their fee structure. In the following section, we examine the determinants of fee changes in a multivariate setting. Finally, panel D of Table II provides the average percentage of funds with fee changes for different hedge fund styles.
Funds following options strategy (23.1%), managed futures (13.8%), and dedicated short bias (13.0%) exhibit most fee changes while funds following long/short equity hedge (6.7%), event driven (4.8%), and fixed income arbitrage (4.7%) have the least proportion of fee changes. To allow for the cross-sectional variation in the incidence of fee changes across different hedge fund styles, we include style dummies in our empirical tests that follow.
IV. Determinants of the fee changes
Univariate results in the previous section indicate that funds that show changes in the fee structure are inherently different from those that do not exhibit such changes. In this section, we conduct multivariate analyses by estimating the following cross-sectional logistic regression at the fund level after controlling for fund's inception year, and other characteristics at the fund's inception including the management fee, incentive fee, redemption notice period, lockup period, payout period, and assets under management. We report the results in panel A of We report the results using funds' raw returns in column 1 of Table III, panel B labeled "Raw Returns". Trailing annual fund returns are positively related to the fee increases (coeff. = 0.941; t-stat = 1.929), which is consistent with our hypotheses of fee changes being motivated by managers expropriating surplus subsequent to good performance. We do not find support for the hypothesis that the fee changes are used to control flows as the relation between fee changes and trailing flows is not significant.
We repeat our analysis with style-adjusted returns and report the results in Table   III , panel B, column 2, labeled "Style-Adjusted Returns". For this specification, we replace the total risk with the idiosyncratic risk in the regression in equation (2). For computing the style-adjusted performance and the idiosyncratic risk, we regress the fund's monthly raw returns over a 12-month period on the average monthly returns of all funds following the same investment style as that of the fund. Style-adjusted performance and the idiosyncratic risk are the intercept and standard deviation of the residuals from this regression. Such style-adjusted returns have been used by Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) among others to proxy for risk-adjusted returns. Corroborating our prior finding using raw returns, we continue to observe a positive relation between the fee changes and past performance when we use style-adjusted performance (coeff. = 1.081; tstat = 2.428).
Finally, we find evidence consistent with mean reversion in incentive and management fees in both specifications (raw returns and style-adjusted returns).
Estimated coefficient on the difference between the fees and the average fees of all funds within the same style is negative and significant in both cases (Raw return, management fee coeff. = -0.338, t-stat = 2.293; Raw return, incentive fee coeff. = -0.089, t-stat = 6.190)
suggesting that funds tend to increase or decrease their management and incentive fees to bring them in line with the average fees for funds in their style.
IV.A Determinants of specific fee changes
In our analyses so far, we did not differentiate between the different types of fee changes. In panel A of Table IV , we report the results from the logistic regressions using the increase and decrease in the incentive fee and management fee (columns (1) to (4)), and addition and removal of the HWM (columns (5) and (6)) as indicator dependent variables. Given that different types of fee changes are correlated (see panel G of Table I), we allow for changes in other components of the fee structure while modeling the change in one of the components. For example, when we examine the incentive fee increase or decrease, we include the increase and decrease in the management fee, and addition and removal of the HWM as independent variables. If there are no observations for a certain combination such as the incentive fee increase and the removal of HWM in column (1), we cannot estimate the slope coefficient for removal of HWM.
The major findings from the results in Table IV panel A are as follows. Column
(1) shows a directionally positive relation between incentive fee increase and trailing style-adjusted returns (coeff. = 1.505; t-stat = 1.473). This finding can be consistent with either the managers learning about their skill over time and expropriating the surplus by charging higher fees or unskilled managers acting opportunistically after a lucky run.
While the former would suggest a better future performance subsequent to a fee increase, the latter will predict worse future performance. Later in Section V, we will be able to disentangle between these two competing explanations when we examine the impact of fee increase on future performance. We also observe that increases in the incentive fee are accompanied by the addition of HWM suggesting that investors require the addition of the HWM to curtail increased risk-taking behavior following an increase in the incentive fee.
Results in column (2) for the incentive fee decrease are diametrically opposite to those for the increase. There is a 10% significant negative relation between the incentive fee decreases and trailing style-adjusted returns (coeff. = -3.090; t-stat = 1.752) as well as and removal of HWM is positively and related to the fee decreases. This suggests that the managers' response to past performance in terms of altering the incentive fee is symmetric.
In both the case of increases and decreases, estimated coefficient on deviation from style average suggests mean reversion in fees. In the case of fee increases, the coefficient is negative and significant (coeff. = -0.184; t-stat = −3.190), indicating that funds below the style fee average are more likely to increase their fees. Similarly, in the case of fee decreases, the coefficient is positive and significant (coeff. = 0.119; t-stat = 3.924), indicating that funds above the style fee average are more likely to decrease their fees.
Moving on to changes in the management fee, results in column (3) of panel A of Table IV show that the increase in management fee towards the style average with the coefficient on the deviation being negative and significant (coeff. = -1.001; t-stat = 2.394).
Results also show a positive relation between management fee increase and aggregate flows in the hedge fund industry (coeff. = 0.151; t-stat. = 2.208). We interpret these results are management fees being driven up by increased demand for hedge fund investments.
Results presented in column (4) of Panel A of Table IV show a weakly significant positive relation between fund size and a fee decreases (coeff. = 0.153; t-stat = 1.720).
This is interpreted as funds decreasing management fees as a result of passing on savings from economies of scale to their investors.
Finally, columns (5) and (6) of panel A of Table IV report the results for the determinants of the addition and removal of the HWM feature respectively. Notable findings here are that the addition of HWM is driven by an increase in the incentive fee (coeff. = 5.780; t-stat. = 5.542). This is consistent with investors and fund managers negotiating to offset the increased risk from the call-option-like incentive fee contract with lower risk associated with addition of HWM. Also, there is a positive relation between adding HWM and past style-adjusted performance which confirms that the increase in the incentive fee following superior performance is typically accompanied with the addition of the HWM provision. Unlike the case of incentive fee where the determinants are symmetric for increases and decreases, findings for the removal of HWM do not contrast well with those for the addition of HWM. In addition to both the increase and decrease in the management fee being positively related to the removal of HWM (which is also the case for the addition of HWM), size is positively related to the removal of HWM. We interpret the latter finding as larger funds being able to negotiate better terms of compensation by getting rid of the HWM feature.
To further investigate the determinants of the fee changes, we report the results from the ordered logistic regressions for changes in the incentive fee and the management fee in columns (1) and (2) of panel B of Table IV , and the OLS regressions for changes in the magnitude of the incentive fee and the management fee in columns (3) and (4). For the ordered logistic regressions, the dependent variable takes a value of −1 for fee decrease, 0 for no change, and +1 for fee increase.
Results in panel B resonate well with those from panel A. We continue to find a positive relation between incentive fee increase and both the past style-adjusted performance and the addition of HWM. Also, we observe that the management fee increases are positively associated with capital flows both at the fund level. Finally, we observe a negative and significant estimated coefficient on the difference from style average in all specifications, which suggest that funds tend to change their fees to converge towards the style average.
V. Relation between the fee changes, future performance, risk-taking behavior, and fund flows
Having examined the determinants of fee changes, the next natural step is to examine how the fee changes influence future performance and risk-taking behavior of the fund managers, and how the investors respond to the fee changes in terms of capital inflows into the funds. We analyze these issues in this section, starting with analysis of the effect of fee changes on fund performance.
V.A Fee changes and future performance
We have two competing hypotheses regarding how changes in the fees may be related to future performance. If the changes are made by the skilled fund managers who learn about their skill over time and now want to receive a larger share of the funds' profits, it would predict better future fund performance. In contrast, if the fee changes are a mechanism for the unskilled fund managers to opportunistically benefit after being lucky then future performance would be worse.
We expect these competing hypotheses to be more relevant for the incentive fees.
We do not expect the changes in the management fees to have first-order effects on future returns. To the extent the changes in the management fees are used to control inflows in response to decreasing returns to scale, this may influence future returns. However, given that the funds can restrict flows using other techniques (closing the fund to new investment or adding conditions to new flows, such as lockups, gates, and increased redemption notice periods), it is not clear that funds increasing management fees to control flows will have significantly different future flows and performance compared to similar funds that may choose to restrict flows in other ways.
To test these hypotheses, we compare the sample of funds that have changed fees to a matched sample of funds that do not change fees. At the time of each fee change, we find a matching fund that has not changed fees in the period, and is the closest in terms of the AUM and recent performance to another fund that changed the fees. In this manner,
we obtain a sample of observations twice the size of the number of fee changes. For each type of fee change (fee increases and decreases, increases and decreases in specific components of the fee structure (i.e., incentive fee and management fee) as well as the addition an removal of the high watermark feature), we obtain a corresponding matching sample using the technique outlined above.
Once we have these samples, we compare our variable of interest (performance or risk or flows 8 ) six months before and after across the funds that change fees and the matched sample with no fee change, using a paired t-test. For example, when examining the effect of performance, we compare the changes between future and past returns of funds that have changed fees with the changes in returns of those in the matched sample and report the magnitude and statistical significance of the difference-in-difference. Our choice of using six-month period before and after the fee change is driven by two reasons.
First, we have a relatively short sample period of three years. Using longer time window significantly affects the power of our tests. Second, extending the length of the time window around fee change will also impose survivorship bias that will particularly affect any inferences about the changes in performance.
The matched sample analysis allows us to control for any mean reversion or persistence in the performance, as well as possible differential effects of the fee changes across funds of different sizes. We present the results from the difference-in-difference analyses in Table V. Our findings in panel A of Table V show a statistically significant decline in the performance difference before and after the fee increase for the funds with fee change when compared to funds with no fee change. Return differential is lower by 7.85% and significant at the 5% level. Decomposing the fee changes into those in the incentive fee and management fee, we observe that the above result seems to be mainly driven by the management fee increases (with the return differential across the matched samples being lower by 7.21%, and significant at the 5% level). These findings are consistent with the managers behaving opportunistically to increase fees when demand for funds is high.
Additionally, although the difference-in-difference of returns for the funds increasing incentive fees and similar funds that do not increase fees is not economically or statistically significant, point estimates of return changes show that both types of funds underperform compared to previous periods. This finding is also consistent with managers increasing fees opportunistically without delivering future superior performance. Repeating the same analysis using the style-adjusted returns instead of raw returns corroborates these findings (see panel B).
V.B Fee changes and future fund flows
We have two hypotheses regarding how future fund flows will change with the changes in the funds' fee structure. If fee changes are used to control fund flows then one would expect to observe changes in the fund flows to be negatively related to the fee changes. In other words, the fee increases (decreases) should be associated with lower (higher) fund flows in the future. However, we note that that unlike mutual funds, hedge funds have a variety of other techniques to restrict inflows and thus recognize that this may reduce the difference in future inflows between funds that increase the incentive fees and similar funds that do not (but could potentially be restricting flows using other techniques). In contrast, if the fee changes are used to expropriate surplus and investors respond rationally to this behavior of the fund managers, then we should expect to see a negative relation between the changes in the fund flows and any fee change. To disentangle these two competing hypotheses, we conduct a difference-in-difference test between the flows before and after the fee changes for the matched samples.
Our findings in panel C of Table V show a statistically significant flow differential for fee decrease (diff. = 10.07%; p-value = 0.06) but not for the fee increase (diff. = −2.75%; p-value = 0.68). Separating the overall fee changes into the changes in the different components of the fee structure, we observe that the increase in flows subsequent to the fee decrease is driven by the decrease in the management fee (diff. = 9.05%; p-value = 0.10). Taken together, these findings suggest that the fee changes are used to control the fund flows. In particular, while the fee increases do not seem to significantly restrict inflows compared to similar funds, the fee decreases do attract further inflows. This is consistent with the view that funds similar to those raising the management fees have other avenues to restrict inflows.
V.C Fee changes and future risk-taking behavior of funds
For changes in the future risk-taking behavior of hedge funds, we have different predictions depending on the type of fee change. Given the asymmetric option-like feature of incentive fee contract, an increase (decrease) in the incentive fees should be associated with an increase (decrease) in the risk-taking behavior (Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) , Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) ). In contrast to the incentive fee, management fee is like a perpetuity if the hedge fund continues to be in business.
Therefore, an increase in management fee should attenuate the risk-taking behavior of fund managers as they would not favor increasing the risk to raise the probability of funds' liquidation and lose the steady stream of cash flows from the management fees.
Finally, adding high watermark (HWM) can also reduce the risk-taking incentives for the fund managers as HWM can be considered as a sequence of options with changing strike price. Panageas and Westerfield (2009) show that in presence of HWM, even a riskneutral manager will not place an unboundedly large weight on the risky asset despite the option-like feature of the incentive contract. We test for these different hypotheses by comparing the difference in standard deviation of returns, six months before and after the fee changes across the matched samples. Although we observe increase (decrease) in the total risk and idiosyncratic risk in panels D and E of Table V for fee increases (decreases), the difference-in-difference between the two samples are largely insignificant except for a couple of instances (overall fee decrease and management fee decrease have statistically significant effects on total risk, but not idiosyncratic risk). This may be due to the limited number of time-series return observations for precisely estimating the standard deviation.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, contrary to conventionally held belief of no fee changes for hedge funds, we provide evidence of both fee increases and decreases with similar incidence.
Moreover, fee changes tend to manifest across all the three components of the fee structure, namely the management fee, the incentive fee, and the high watermark feature, often in tandem.
We examine a sample of these fee changes and find that funds respond symmetrically to past performance by increasing the incentive fees following good performance and decreasing the incentive fee following poor performance. In contrast, funds tend to increase the management fees following higher capital flows in the hedge fund industry while larger funds reduce their management fees. We also observe a mean reversion in fee changes (both for incentive fee and management fee) where funds that deviate from the average fees within their investment style tend to change their fees towards the average.
Fee changes have significant implications for future performance. Future performance is worse subsequent to the fee increase without an equivalent impact on the future performance for the fee decrease. Moreover, fund flows tend to be higher after the fee decreases, a result driven by the management fee rather than the incentive fee. Taken together, these findings seem to be consistent with managers opportunistically raising fees following a lucky streak.
Most extant academic studies do not factor in potential changes in the hedge fund compensation structure once investment has been initiated. Given the non-trivial frequency of the fee changes, this may be a serious oversight. In particular, our conclusions suggesting that the fund managers act opportunistically to increase fees subsequent to good performance and then fail to deliver superior performance in the future serve as a caution for investors considering investments in the "hot new fund." *** *** *** Panel A reports the means, standard deviations, and number of fund-month observations for funds that do not exhibit changes in their fee structures and operational characteristics while Panel B reports the same statistics for funds that have changes in their fee structures. Panel C reports the t-statistics from t-tests comparing the means of the different components of the fee structure (incentive fee, management fee, and high watermark) and other fund level charactersitics including the year in which the fund was started (Inception Year), notice that investors need to provide for withdrawing their money (Redemption Notice Period), the period for which investments are locked up before first withdrawal (Lockup Period), time period before an investor will receive cash back (Payout Period), logarithm of assets under management (AUM) at inception (Log AUM at inception). It has presented means of the operational characteristics (raw returns of the funds (Returns), logarithm of the assets under management in $ millions (log AUM), net inflow computed as the percentage net inflow based on the AUM in the previous period, and months in operation (or age of the fund in months)). Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by **,*, and + respectively. In Panel A, the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals to one if a fund changes its fees at any time over the sample period and zero if fund does not change its fees. The independent variables are incentive fee and management fee for the fund at the time of inception (Initial IFee and Initial MFee), year in which the fund was started (Inception Year), notice that investors need to provide for withdrawing their money (Redemption Notice Period), the period for which investments are locked up before first withdrawal (Lockup Period), time period before an investor will receive cash back (Payout Period), logarithm of assets under management (AUM) at inception (Log AUM at inception), and style dummies for the different hedge fund styles. Panel B presents the results from ordered logistic regressions, where the dependent variable takes a −1, 0, or +1 value depending on fee changes in a given period. A fee decrease is recorded as a −1, a fee increase is reflected as a +1 and all other periods are reflected as a zero. Column (1) presents results using raw returns and column (2) shows results using style-adjusted returns. The independent variables are logarithm of assets under management (AUM), time, which is the calendar time starting from 1 and increasing by 1 for each subsequent month, trailing inflows are the net inflows into the fund over the last 12 months expressed as a percentage of AUM at the beginning of the year, aggregate hedge fund (HF) inflow are the aggregate monthly hedge fund inflows as a percentage of total AUM for all hedge funds in the sample, difference between the incentive (management) fee before the change and the average level of the incentive (management) fee at the style level, trailing returns are fund's raw returns over last 12 months, trailing total risk is the standard deviation of fund's raw returns over the last 12 months, trailing styleadjusted returns are the fund's raw returns over the average raw returns of all the funds following the same investment style over the last 12 months, and trailing idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the residuals from regressing fund's raw returns on the average raw returns of all funds following the same investment style over a period of 12 months. The standard errors are clustered at fund level. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by **,*, and + respectively. This table presents changes in returns, net inflows, and risk for the period six months after a fee change with the sixmonth period before the fee change.The average changes are presented in the first and second column of each panel for funds that changed fees and a matched sample of funds, where each fund that changes fees is matched to a fund that does not change fees in the same period, which has the closest assets under management (AUM) and recent historical performance. The third and fourth column present the difference in the changes and the p-values for the difference. Panels A and B present the results for changes in raw and style-adjusted returns. Panel C presents the results for changes in net inflow. The matched sample in Panel C also matches on recent net inflows. Panels D and E present the results for total and idiosyncratic risk. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by **,*, and + respectively. 
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